Is it possible to talk about God without either misrepresentation or failing to assert anything of significance? The article begins by reviewing how, in attempting to answer this question, traditional theories of religious language have failed to sidestep both potential pitfalls adequately. After arguing that recently developed theories of metaphor seem better able to shed light on the nature of religious language, it considers the claim that huge areas of our language and, consequently, of our experience are shaped by metaphors. Finally, it considers some of the more significant implications of this claim for our understanding of both religious language and religious experience.
when employed in non-religious discourse-these two different meanings being as unrelated as, for example, the various meanings of the word 'bat'. The problem with this alternative view is that, if religious language were simply equivocal, then it seems that we could never know whether or not we were describing God correctly. For, whereas we can certainly acquire the mundane meanings of words, what would enable us to grasp the religious meanings? And if we do not understand the religious meanings, we would not be able to make true statements about God. And hence, we would lack all knowledge of the divinity. But we do possess some knowledge of God through revelation. Therefore, Aquinas concluded that when we refer to God, we cannot be employing words equivocally.
As an alternative both to the view that religious language was univocal and to the view that it was equivocal, Aquinas proposed that religious discourse was analogical, placing particular emphasis on a variety of analogy that he terms 'analogy of attribution'. Aquinas illustrates analogy of attribution with the following example. Consider the word 'health'.
When we think of healthy people we attribute health to them in a literal sense. But we might also think of medicine as healthy. However, it is clear that medicine is not healthy in the same way in which people are healthy. By means of this example, Aquinas identified a use of words that he believed falls somewhere between the univocal and the equivocal. And it is by speaking in this manner-by employing analogies of attribution-that, Aquinas holds, we can talk meaningfully about God. As he writes: some words are used neither univocally nor purely equivocally of God and creatures, but analogically, for we cannot speak of God at all except in the language we use of creatures, and so whatever is said both of God and creatures is said in virtue of the order that creatures have to God as to their source and cause in which all perfections of things pre-exist transcendentally.
Thus, there would be no significant difference between saying 'God is a rose' and saying 'God is a father', because God is the cause of both roses and fathers. Aquinas attempted to sidestep this difficulty by arguing that, since God is infinite, terms that are capable of referring to the infinite are the ones most suitable for applying to the divine. While this excludes words like 'rose', it allows words like 'good' to be used in describing God.
However, this strategy also excludes words like 'father'-words that Aquinas clearly is interested in retaining. So, he further modifies the theory to include metaphors, which he regarded as a valuable means of genuinely saying something about God. Nevertheless, he maintained that metaphor was not as important within religious language as analogy. Because of the primacy he accorded to analogy over metaphor, he failed to develop a detailed account of the way that metaphor functions in religious language.
Moreover, there appears to be a serious flaw in Aquinas' account of analogy. The problem lies in Aquinas' understanding of causation-a notion that plays a key role in his theory. For the reason why certain terms can be applied to God analogically, he argues, is because God is the cause of all things. In short, Aquinas assumes that whatever qualities an effect had must be present transcendentally in the cause of that effect. And he took this to entail that effects must bear some likeness to their causes. Consequently, given his belief that God is the cause of everything that exists, Aquinas held that there is a certain qualified likeness between God the creator and God's creatures. In technical theological terms, this likeness is known as the analogia entis. It is because of this special likeness between God and 'His' creation that, according to Aquinas, we are able to use words analogically in order to speak about God. So, Aquinas' theory of analogy depends upon a specific understanding of what causation involves. Clearly, if one rejects this view of causation, and most people today would reject the assumption that whatever qualities an effect possesses must be present transcendentally in its cause, then Aquinas' theory loses its power to explain how words can be used analogically to refer to God. Indeed, in the twentieth century, the theory of religious language as analogical struck many people as unpersuasive precisely because they no longer shared Aquinas' beliefs about causation, and hence no longer subscribed to a worldview that recognized the analogia entis.
Each of the three traditional theories of religious language was developed as a response to the question: how can religious language meaningfully refer to a God who, if such exists, is radically different from everything else to which our language refers? Both Aquinas' analogical theory of religious language and the via negativa were attempts to find a middle way between the twin dangers of misrepresenting God, on the one hand, and failing to talk meaningfully, on the other. The fear underlying this seeming dilemma is that the gap between God and any human conceptual scheme is so great that anything we might attempt to say about God would be either meaningless or a complete misrepresentation. Moreover, the avoidance of one danger seems to lead to the other: for in order to prevent language about God appearing meaningless, some have felt the need to try to make it as precise as possible.
But the more precise religious language becomes, and as a result, the more specific becomes one's conception of God, the greater is the risk of misrepresenting the divinity. Theories of religious language, both traditional and modern, have thus been shaped by their framer's perception of where the greatest danger lies.
Aquinas clearly feared that meaninglessness posed the greatest danger to religious belief.
And while avoiding the pitfall of possible misrepresentation by pointing out that language is not univocal (or literal), he set about trying to show how non-literal language can nevertheless be meaningful: it can convey meaning through analogy. Thus his theory of religious language served to explain the way in which it could be meaningful without appealing to the univocal commitments of those who understood religious language literally. Advocates of the via negativa, in contrast, took misrepresentation to be the greatest danger. While seeking to avoid the pitfall of meaningless talk-though how successfully is moot-by making literally true claims (such as 'God is not material'), they avoided misrepresenting God by refusing to say anything positive about the divine. It is notable how the problem of religious language, as it persisted in twentieth-century philosophy of religion, retained the same basic form that it held in the Middle Ages: how one can meaningfully use language about God without wholesale misrepresentation of the divinity.
However, the charge that all language purporting to refer to God was meaningless, advanced in the early-twentieth century by the logical positivists, stimulated a renewed interest in certain quarters in theories, such as that of Aquinas, which attempted to explain how religious language could, nevertheless, be meaningful. However, given that Aquinas' theory is unacceptable to many modern people because of its seemingly antiquated metaphysical presuppositions, a number of religious believers began to search for alternative ways of understanding the language they employed to talk about their religious beliefs and experiences. One seemingly fecund approach is to treat religious discourse as metaphorical.
II. Religious language as metaphor
Metaphor is a figure of speech in which we speak about one thing in terms that are usually employed to talk about something else. 13 Although metaphor is ubiquitous within ordinary, as well as within explicitly poetic, speech and writing, until the twentieth century metaphorical expressions were commonly regarded as inferior to non-figurative ones. The belief that only literal language is capable of being true, which is commonly attributed to Plato, has been held responsible for the view that metaphors only play a minor linguistic role. Until recently, most philosophers assumed that metaphors were merely ornamental, and were, moreover, translatable into literal language without loss of meaning. In other words, they subscribed to the 'substitution theory', according to which, in metaphorical uses of language, certain figurative words are substituted for other non-figurative words. Thus, the metaphor can be eliminated by simply substituting back the original word.
14 It was only in the twentieth century, when people began to think about language in new ways, that certain philosophers began to develop more adequate theories of metaphor. Given the importance of metaphor within religious texts, it is no surprise that these new theories can be employed to shed light on the nature of religious language.
Richards and Black on Metaphor
I. A. Richards was the first to reconsider the role metaphors play in language, and hence the first to reject the substitution theory, 15 with Max Black following his lead. Both insist that, far from being merely ornamental and reducible to literal language (as the substitution theory claimed), metaphors can be used to say things that cannot be said in any other way.
Consequently, they play an irreplaceable role in our language. 16 In arguing against the substitution theory, both Richards and Black reject the view that individual words are the bearers of meaning. Instead, the relationship between words and meaning is far more complex, which Richards sought to elucidate by means of, what he calls, an 'interanimative' theory of metaphor.
Rather than construe individual words as possessing a meaning that is fixed independently both of the way they are used and of the context of their utterance, Richards proposes that the meaning of words can only be arrived at through considering 'the interplay of the interpretive possibilities of the whole utterance' in which the words are lodged. 17 In the case of metaphor, the interpretive possibilities are extended. Consider the use of 'pig' as a metaphor for 'glutton'. When we call someone a pig, we elicit both the thought of a pig and the thought of a glutton. In Richards' view, 'when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is the result of their interaction.' 18 A metaphor, then, does not work simply by bringing together two words, each with its own fixed meaning, and thereby somehow producing a meaning that is a fusion of the two original meanings. Rather, a successful metaphor, in Richards' view, creates a new meaning from the interaction, or 'interanimation', of the two original meanings. In other words, metaphors operate by drawing together pairs of meaning that are not usually thought of together. Richards' key idea is that both are essential to the success of the metaphor as a generator of meaning.
Black developed a similar theory, which he calls the 'interactive theory of metaphor', but adds that metaphors make certain features prominent, and that this then shapes our perception. As he argues by means of the metaphor 'Man is a wolf': 'Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and
any that cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others-in short, organizes our view of man.' 19 Hence, Black holds that, in bringing together the complex frameworks of meaning invoked by the terms 'man' and 'wolf', the metaphor works in a much more subtle way than the traditional substitution theory acknowledges. In forcing us to select which aspects of talk about wolves can be applied to man and which cannot, the metaphor changes the way in which we think about man. If the metaphor succeeds, henceforth the meanings associated with the word 'man' will, in part, be structured by the meanings associated with wolves. Thus, an important change will have taken place in the way we think about men-a change that cannot be irreducibly expressed in literal language. Moreover, our thinking about wolves will not remain unchanged for, 'if to call a man a wolf is to put him in a special light, we must not forget that the metaphor makes the wolf seem more human than he otherwise would.' 20 
Soskice on Metaphor and Religious Language
Janet Martin Soskice has employed the theories of both Richards and Black to develop what is, perhaps, the most influential account of metaphor and religious language to appear to date. 21 Like Richards and Black, she rejects the substitution theory of metaphor, and emphasizes the role metaphors play in generating new perspectives capable of increasing our understanding. In her view, by generating new perspectives, successful metaphors expand our descriptive powers in a way that other types of linguistic expressions do not. 22 In short, metaphors 'disclose' to view what has not been previously available. 23 Consider the following example:
When we speak of the camel as 'the ship of the desert', the relational irreducibility of the metaphor lies in the potentially limitless suggestions that are evoked by considering the camel on the model of a ship: the implied corollaries of a swaying motion, a heavy and precious cargo, a broad wilderness, a route mapped by stars, distant ports of call, and so on. Saying merely 'camel'
does not bring in these associations at all…. 24 Thus, the metaphor of the camel as 'the ship of the desert' genuinely tells us something about camels that we would not have been able to learn without the help of the metaphor. The range of associations evoked by metaphors such as this one is, then, one of their principal advantages and, according to Soskice, one of the chief reasons why they are indispensable.
Moreover, the evocative function of metaphors can, she stresses, be particularly important within religious language, where it might serve to facilitate a new range of experiences-ones for which there may be no established literal description.
This might suggest that Soskice regards the principal function of metaphor as evocative.
However, she argues strongly that it is a mistake to view metaphors and models (in other words, extended metaphors) as having a primarily evocative function. Rather, a 'model in religious language may evoke an emotional, moral, or spiritual response but this does not mean that the model has no cognitive or explanatory function. In fact the reverse is true; the model can only be affective because it is taken as explanatory…. The cognitive function is primary.' 25 Soskice further claims that in order to explain the cognitive function of metaphors and models within religious language, we must consider the way in which they are actually employed. So, using the model of God as 'father', which is so prominent within Christianity,
to illustrate how models function in religious language, she points out that those who use this particular model implicitly base further convictions upon it. 26 For example, the use of this model presumes that 'if God is our father, he will hear us when we cry to him; if God is our father, then as children and heirs we come to him without fear; if God is our father, he will not give us stones when we ask for bread'. 27 Such convictions are, she argues, actionguiding-and therein lies their cognitive content.
Soskice also argues that metaphorical terms can 'be seen as denoting candidates for real existence', and that such terms can be reality depicting despite the fact that they are not 'exhaustively descriptive'. 28 Indeed, metaphorical terms are characteristically vague, and this, Soskice argues, is one of their virtues. In both religion and science, Soskice avers, metaphorical terms are indispensable precisely because they are vague. Without this vagueness, there would be a tendency for people to regard the terms as expressing a complete understanding of the aspect of reality in question. They would thus be prone to dogmatism and resistant to any proposed changes to the theory expressed by these terms. In consequence, their theories might cease to be responsive to any new knowledge which comes to light. Thus, the great virtue of metaphor in the context of religious and scientific theories is that it allows us to refer to what really exists, while conceding that our knowledge of the relevant aspects of reality might be incomplete. And metaphor makes this possible because it is a way of using language that allows us to refer to things without defining them. Soskice:
This is the fine edge at which negative theology and positive theology meet, for the apophatic insight that we say nothing of God, but only point towards Him, is the basis for the tentative and avowedly inadequate stammerings by which we attempt to speak of God and His acts. And…this separation of referring and defining is at the very heart of metaphorical speaking and is what makes it not only possible but necessary that in our stammering after a transcendent God we must speak, for the most part, metaphorically or not at all.
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The great advantage of metaphor, then, is that it allows people to refer to God without their having to define 'God'. Thus, metaphorical uses of language would seem to allow religious believers to talk meaningfully about God (supposing that they do in fact succeed in referring), while simultaneously avoiding the danger of misrepresentation. For example, a theist might employ the phrase 'God is a rock'. A statement such as this, if Soskice is correct, can refer to God but should not be understood as either defining or describing the divine. Thus, it can be true that 'God is a rock', without having to be literally true. The claim can be true insofar it tells us something about God's supposed characteristics-but we should not understand it as the claim that God is literally a rock.
Promising as this approach has seemed to many, there is an apparent difficulty with the claim that religious language is metaphorical. When we use metaphor to talk about everyday things-for example, using 'pig' to refer to gluttons-both are not usually too far removed from our experience. But in the case of religious language this is not so. Consider again the example, 'God is a rock'. Clearly, we know what a rock is. But does this really tell us
anything at all about God? The problem is that what one of the terms refers to is unknown.
Soskice responds to this objection by pointing out how important metaphor has been in the development of scientific theories. Let me give an example. When people started using the word 'electron', they did not know much about electrons or their properties. And clearly, electrons are not accessible to our experience in the way that rocks are. Initially, scientists referred to an electron as a particle, despite the fact that electrons are, in a number of crucial respects, not at all like the particles we encounter in our immediate experience. In certain respects, electrons are nothing like grains of sand, for example. Other scientists then began referring to electrons as waves. But again, the use of 'wave' was clearly metaphorical. In several crucial respects, an electron is nothing like the surface of the sea. Seemingly worse, what, exactly, is a wave-particle supposed to be? Yet the metaphors of wave and particle were indispensable in enabling scientists to pick out the objects they wished to study. The term 'wave-particle' was able to refer to electrons without literally describing them. And once those particles were referred to, they could be studied empirically.
Electrons, then, provide an example of how metaphors allow us to refer to things outside of our immediate experience without literally describing them. If scientists can do that with respect to things like electrons, then surely believers can do the same with respect to God. In short, metaphors can enable us to refer to entities that we would be unable to refer to were our uses of language exclusively literal.
This seems a very strong response because, if Soskice is right, it implies that theologians are not doing anything significantly different, in a sense, from what scientists are doing. Both require metaphors to refer to the objects that concern them. However, it could be objected against Soskice that scientists can conduct experiments that give us some reason for thinking that the phenomena they are able to study directly are caused by electrons. New data often requires some revision in what we take electrons to be. And this suggests that we are learning more about electrons. But what is the parallel evidence that suggests we are successfully referring to God? Soskice argues that the theist's confidence in the existence of that to which his or her 'God-talk' aims to refer is grounded in religious experience. 30 Moreover, she believes that the experience of saintly individuals is likely to carry the most weight. 31 Such people may be the best placed to instil in others confidence that their talk about God has a real referent. Moreover, there is a sense in which a religious tradition embodies the cumulative experiences of its participants through the ages. It is a tradition of experience and of interpretation, against the background of which metaphorical religious language is used and understood. Soskice argues, then, that religious traditions, scriptures and the experience upon which they are based can provide sufficient background information to give us an idea of that for which the unknown term in religious language stands. But this response clearly presupposes some degree of faith, and is therefore of little use to a sceptic. Moreover, any reliance on private experiences, as religious experiences tend to be, seems to make religious systems are related to our experience, and to how understanding emerges from this relationship.
The primary focus of interest within the work of Lakoff and Johnson is on our conceptual systems-in other words, on the 'concepts that structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people'. 34 They take it for granted, however, that we cannot simply look inward and thereby study our conceptual system. Put another way, we cannot make it an object of direct knowledge. Nevertheless, they assume that our conceptual system can be studied; namely, by means of the language we use. Because our language, they claim, is based upon our conceptual system, then the structure of our language provides evidence regarding the structure of our conceptual system. And the linguistic evidence, they maintain, establishes 'that most of our ordinary conceptual system is metaphorical in nature'.
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The force of the argument Lakoff and Johnson present derives from the many examples they provide in support of their case. One of the most persuasive of these, which is often referred to by subsequent authors, is the metaphor 'argument is war'. Lakoff and Johnson use this metaphor as an illustration of a 'conceptual metaphor', which is a metaphor that exercises a structural effect both on our thought and on our everyday activity. They begin by drawing attention to a variety of metaphors that are subsidiary to the conceptual metaphor 'argument is war', and which, themselves, form part of our ordinary way of talking about arguments. Commenting on these common metaphorical ways of speaking, they claim:
It is important to see that we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own. We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument-attack, defense, counterattack, etc.-reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing. 36 In understanding arguments in terms of war, then, we thereby stipulate what arguments consist in within our culture. And anyone who did not employ the metaphor 'argument is war'
would not experience 'arguments' in the way that those who accept the metaphor clearly do.
known for his many rapid conquests'; 'He won her hand in marriage'; or 'He overpowered her'.
But if Lakoff and Johnson are correct, these conceptual metaphors do more than merely allow us to think and talk about love in novel ways. A new conceptual metaphor will also enable us to experience love in a new manner. In other words, the alteration in our conceptual system caused by the introduction of a new conceptual metaphor is such as to change what we experience. Consequently, when people began to think of love as war, Lakoff and Johnson argue, they also began to experience love as war-their reality had begun to change.
Therefore, when different people come to diverge in the conceptual metaphors they employ to structure their thought, language and experience, then there is a sense in which they will no longer share the same reality. And this way of understanding how it might be that different people experience different 'realities' may shed light on cultural diversity, given that many striking differences between conceptual metaphors can be found across cultures.
As users of metaphor, then, we can transform 'reality', at least in the sense of bringing about significant changes to the 'perceptions, conceptualizations, motivations, and actions that constitute most of what we experience'. 39 And as Lakoff and Johnson point out, this makes metaphor a political concern. 40 For people in power-and in the twenty-first century, those in control of the media might be thought to be some of the chief wielders of powercan control which metaphors become dominant, and hence can strongly influence how we experience our world. 41 Once a metaphor has become accepted, people will experience the world in the terms it suggests, and thus will view what it entails as true. Consequently, those who shape the metaphors dominant within a culture will thereby exercise a disproportionate influence on what is regarded as true within that culture.
Despite the tremendous significance of this conclusion, Lakoff and Johnson regard issues concerning truth as secondary to what they consider to be the deeper issue: namely, that conceptual metaphors structure our understanding of our experience, and, through that experience, they structure our understanding of the world. Hence, those who can persuade us to adopt their metaphors will, if Lakoff and Johnson are right, be able to lure us into accepting their worldview. And it is this that Lakoff and Johnson take to be of prime importance. We shall consider the relevance of this for religious language shortly. But first, it is worth noting that this is not the only danger inherent in the use of successful conceptual metaphors.
As we noted earlier, the substitution theory held that metaphors were incapable of communicating anything that could not equally be said by means of non-figurative language.
But Lakoff and Johnson argue that the account of non-figurative language presumed by the substitution theory is itself based upon a conceptual metaphor: namely, that of a 'conduit'. 42 This conceptual metaphor has three subsidiary metaphors: 'ideas (or meanings) are objects'; 'linguistic expressions are containers'; and 'communication is sending'. According to Lakoff and Johnson, these metaphors structure the way in which many people think about language. 43 And the image this pattern of metaphors yields is that '[t]he speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a hearer who takes the idea/objects out of the word/containers.' 44 Obvious examples of this way of thinking are 'It's hard to get that idea across to him', 'I gave you that idea', 'It's difficult to put my ideas into words', and so on. 45 Such common linguistic expressions, which seem to be structured by the conduit metaphor-complex, would appear to provide considerable support for the theory Lakoff and Johnson defend.
Thinking about language in terms of the conduit metaphor would seem to present us with a structured pattern for understanding what it is that we do with words. But, as Lakoff and
Johnson argue, this particular metaphor well illustrates how powerful conceptual metaphors can be so successful in structuring our experience that they leave us quite unaware of what is omitted from the worldview they shape-a further feature of conceptual metaphors that should cause us to be wary of them. In other words, through entailing, for example, that words and sentences bear meaning independently of the speaker or context, the conduit metaphor can effectively blind us to the role that speakers and contexts play in the process of communication. Hence, this particular metaphor leaves us without any resources for explaining, or even recognizing, situations in which the meaning is not carried by the words used but by the context in which they are uttered. Furthermore, the conduit metaphor may structure our understanding of language in such a way that we become insensitive to cases in which the same sentence will mean entirely different things to different people because of their different backgrounds, expectations, and so on. Thus, in structuring our thought, action and language, metaphors also screen out various alternatives. 46 The important moral that 
III. Concluding remarks
While each of the three traditional approaches to religious language continues to find advocates, recent theories of metaphor may well provide far superior theoretical accounts of religious discourse.
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Moreover, the view that religious language is principally metaphorical rather than literal might well facilitate regarding a range of metaphors or models of the divine as possessing equal value, even if, at first sight, they appear to be mutually exclusive (for example, the metaphors of father and mother when applied to the deity). And drawing attention to the range of possible metaphors could make it harder for one construal of God to trump all others, especially when each may be regarded as having something to contribute to a fuller religious understanding. This observation could pave the way for an appreciation of how much religious people might stand to gain from exploring the metaphors deployed in a range of religious traditions. Judaism, Christianity and Islam, for example, all attempt to refer to God using distinct, but overlapping, metaphors and models. Viewing these as complementary, rather than as rivals, would seem to become a more acceptable option once religious language is regarded as functioning in the manner outlined above. And clearly, this could be of considerable advantage to the denizens of an increasingly multicultural world.
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1 Rather than exploring the ways in which different conceptions of God might influence thought about religious language, I presuppose a particular view of God-that view which is dominant within Semitic monotheism-and consider religious language as it is employed within the context of belief in that God.
2 It is common to distinguish between, what we might call, 'general religious language', on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a specialised category of religious language called 'theological language'. General religious language includes the language used in religious texts (parables, stories, myths and so on), as well as the language employed by believers in prayer and worship, etc. Such language tends to be replete with images and metaphors, and is sometimes referred to as 'first-order' language. Theological language, by contrast, tends to contain a high proportion of abstract concepts; that is, concepts that are far removed from our direct experience. Thus, it is sometimes referred to as 'second-order' language. In what follows, we shall be concerned principally with general religious language.
22 26 Sallie McFague also uses 'God the Father' as an example of a model within religious language, which she regards as a dominant metaphor that has established itself as a model through its staying power. 'As a model,' she writes, 'it not only retains characteristics of metaphor but also reaches toward qualities of conceptual thought. It suggests a comprehensive, ordering structure with impressive interpretative potential. As a rich model with many associated common-places as well as a host of supporting metaphors, an entire theology can be worked out from this model. Thus, if God is understood on the model of "father", human beings are understood as "children", sin is rebellion against the "father", redemption is sacrifice by the "elder son" on behalf of the "brothers and sisters" for the guilt against the "father" and so on'. McFague, Metaphorical Theology, op. cit., p. 23. Ironically, as McFague points out, it is the very comprehensiveness of successful models that leads people to take them too literally.
